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The international community recognizes climate change as one of the most important risks for 
humanity and encourages efforts to limit global temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-
industrial levels (IPCC, 2014). Greenhouse gas (GHG, hereafter) emissions have proven to be 
directly linked to global warming and breaking current emission trends (i.e. mitigation) in the 
short term is thus key to ensuring temperature stabilization (Friedlingstein et al., 2014). In this 
context, the role of the energy sector becomes crucial for the climate change mitigation process. 
In fact, the source of 65% of worldwide emissions is the use of energy (through fossil fuel 
combustion) and around 40% of the global electricity supply derives from coal-fired stations, the 
top air pollutant source in the power sector (IEA, 2016). Some of the behavioural changes 
needed to mitigate this problem include measures such as shifting towards lower-emitting fuels, 
increasing energy efficiency -both in generation and demand-, reducing deforestation and 
pursuing the carbon capture and storage technologies (Arrow, 2007). Therefore, given their non-
emitting and non-depletable nature, Renewable Energy Sources (RES, hereafter) represent an 
important element in the transition towards a low carbon economy. 
In particular, the Electricity from RES (RES-E, hereafter) has been developed in many countries 
thanks to government support, justified by its positive socioeconomic and environmental 
impacts, with the cost of subsidies generally transferred to electricity consumers. In this paper, 
we perform a regulatory impact assessment by analyzing the net social cost (or benefit) of 
Renewable Energy (RE, hereafter) promotion, and considering not only the economic but also 
the environmental effects of RES-E. To compute the net social cost, we first calculate the net 
effect of RES-E regulation on the monetary costs for consumers (net monetary cost), considering 
that they pay the market price for electricity and also the incentives to green energy, which are 
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included in the bill. Second, we evaluate the environmental benefit of avoided emissions and add 
up the result to the monetary cost to obtain the net social cost of RES promotion. 
The application to RES in Spain is of special interest, given that Spain is one of the leading 
countries in RES promotion worldwide; according to the International Energy Agency, the share 
of solar in total primary energy supply
1
 is the highest among the International Energy Agency 
countries, while the wind share is the third-highest behind Denmark and Portugal (IEA, 2015). 
Additionally, the important growth of RES-E in Spain has been supported by a combined system 
of Feed in Tariffs (FIT, hereafter) and Premiums (FIP, hereafter) from 2008 to 2012 and 
accompanied by an important increase in the regulatory cost of the electricity system. This FIT-
FIP system was phased out in the electricity reform passed in 2013, in an attempt to tackle the 
growing deficit of the electricity system. For the period prior to the reform, 2008-2012, Ciarreta, 
Espinosa and Pizarro-Irizar (2014) obtained the net monetary costs of RES promotion, but no 
consideration was given to its environmental benefits. Finally, Spain/the Iberian peninsula is 
(close to) an energy island (i.e. there are very few interconnections with some other countries 
and, as a consequence, imports/exports are limited), a fact that makes the Spanish case sort of 
interesting for the proposed research study.   
Concerning the environmental effects, RE reduces the use of conventional sources (i.e. coal, oil 
or natural gas), since it acts as a substitute for fossil technologies in electricity production. This 
helps to mitigate the GHG emissions produced in the electricity sector, which is responsible for 
28% of carbon dioxide (CO2, hereafter) emissions in Spain, only surpassed by the transport 
sector with 34% (IEA, 2015). We assess the economic benefits derived from the substitution of 
conventional sources by converting those emission reductions into monetary terms. We follow 
two different approaches to perform this environmental impact assessment: (i) a market-based 
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approach, based on the actual price of the EU’s Emission Trading System (EU ETS, hereafter); 
and (ii) the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC, hereafter) approach based on the marginal cost of 
emitting one extra ton of CO2. If SCC estimates and market emission allowances were perfect 
signals, both approaches would be equivalent. However, this is not the case and annual average 
prices for emissions allowances in Europe, for instance, were even below the lowest SCC mean 
value in 2013.
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 Therefore, since carbon markets are not efficient, a carbon value that takes social 
costs into account needs to be constructed. In fact, SCC estimates are hotly debated in the 
literature, and surely will remain so in the foreseeable future (for instance, two polar examples 
can be found in Revesz et al., 2017 and in EPA, 2017), which makes this research interesting 
from a policy perspective.  
The goal of our paper is twofold. First, we assess the net cost of the RES-E deployment in the 
Spanish electricity system in a timeframe (2002-2015) that allows us to analyze the market when 
renewable participation was still low (2002-2007), when renewable greatest expansion took 
place (2008-2012) and the effect of the phasing out of the incentive system from 2012 onwards. 
Second, we quantify the environmental impact derived from the displacement of conventional 
sources of energy by RES-E. The avoided emissions assessment is carried out by comparing 
market and SCC approaches, including emissions from both CO2 and other air pollutants (nitrous 
oxide-NOx, sulfur dioxide-SO2 and particulate matter-PM).
3
 The results are relevant to the debate 
over the financial burden of the RES-E implementation and the discussion about the instruments 
and mechanisms for climate change mitigation at the lowest cost.    
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature regarding the 
effect of RES-E deployment and carbon prices. Section 3 then describes the data and the 
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methods applied, and Section 4 discusses the main results. Finally, Section 5 presents the 
conclusions and policy implications.   
2. Beyond the merit order effect 
The presence of RES-E in power markets affects the two components of the market price in 
different ways: (i) the regulated component, which increases prices due to the payment of the 
FITs by the electricity consumers; and (ii) the market component, which modifies prices due to 
the presence of the RES-E in the energy mix. This latter effect is known as the merit order effect 
(MOE) and the combination of these two opposite forces determines the net effect of RES-E on 
consumer prices. 
The MOE is one of the most studied phenomena regarding the deployment of RES-E. From a 
theoretical standpoint, Jensen and Skytte (2002, 2003) were among the first to point out that the 
integration of RES-E into the generation mix reduces the electricity market price. This is due to 
its lower variable costs compared to conventional fuel electricity sources. Since RES-E uses 
inputs that cannot be accumulated (e.g. wind or sun), the opportunity cost for non-dispatchable 
energy sources is zero. Consequently, RES-E producers, unlike conventional fuel generators, 
have the incentive to sell the electricity generated at zero prices, displacing conventional fuel 
electricity sources and reducing the market electricity price (Gallego-Castillo and Victoria, 
2015). Additionally, when the MOE is computed as the difference between actual electricity 
prices and counterfactual prices in absence of RES-E (ceteris paribus), it also controls for other 
factors that could be affecting prices, such as demand changes, supply changes, fossil fuel price 
changes and carbon price changes. It could be argued that without incentives to renewable 
energy, investors would have launched other projects in different technologies. However, this is 
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unlikely for Spain, given that the electricity market exhibits high reserve margins even excluding 
renewable sources (Ciarreta, Espinosa and Pizarro-Irizar, 2014). Another criticism to this 
methodology could be that other technologies’ supply curves could be affected in the long run by 
RES-E presence (given the intermittency of some sources). Ciarreta, Espinosa and Pizarro-Irizar 
(2017) explored the shape of Spanish supply curves before and after the introduction of 
renewable sources and concluded that only combined cycle plants (11% of the electricity mix in 
2015) experienced a change in the slope of their supply curves as a consequence of RES-E. 
The MOE has been widely analyzed in the empirical literature for energy policy analysis. 
Sensfuß, Ragwitz, and Genoese (2008) and Sáenz de Miera, del Río González, and Vizcaíno 
(2008) were among the first authors conducting empirical analysis on this effect for Germany 
and Spain, respectively. Similarly, other authors have also focused on this approach: Weight 
(2009) and Cludius et al. (2014) for Germany; Munksgaard and Morthorst (2008) for Denmark; 
Forrest and MacGill (2013) and Cutler et al. (2011) for Australia; and, Gelabert, Labandeira, and 
Linares (2011), Gil, Gomez-Quiles, and Riquelme (2012), Azofra et al. (2014) and Ciarreta, 
Espinosa, and Pizarro-Irizar (2014) for Spain, among others.  
However, when assessing the economic impact of RES-E, other environmental implications 
should also be taken into account. In this regard, the emission reduction due to RES-E has 
already been quantified in the empirical literature. For Europe,
4
 van den Bergh, Delarue, and 
D’haeseleer (2013) showed that total annual CO2 displacement due to RES-E deployment was 
over 100 MtCO2/year for the period 2007-2010. According to Rathmann (2007), Germany was 
able to reduce CO2 emissions by 25.7 MtCO2/year from 2000-2002 to 2005-2007 due to the 
public support devoted to RES-E. For Spain, Ortega, del Río, and Montero (2013) calculated that 
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the total avoided emissions for Spain during 2002-2011 ranged between 122.5 and 168.3 MtCO2, 
peaking at 27.9 MtCO2/year in 2011.  
There are two main approaches to translate this RES abatement potential into economic terms. 
First, if emission allowance markets were efficient, actual market prices should provide the 
marginal cost/benefit of reducing emissions. However, actual market prices may not reflect the 
marginal costs and benefits of reducing emissions and usually they are highly volatile. Second, 
the approaches based on the SCC predict the potential future damage caused by emissions, 
although they involve a large uncertainty in the estimates.  
Using historical carbon prices, and looking at renewable incentives only as a policy to abate CO2 
emissions, Marcantonini and Ellerman (2015) found that German support for wind energy 
induced reductions of CO2 emissions at a carbon price higher but of the same order of magnitude 
than the historically observed EU ETS price, but incentives to solar power led to abatement costs 
above EUR500/tCO2. The literature provides empirical evidence supporting the fact that RES 
deployment reduces emission prices (Koch et al. 2014). Specifically, Rathman (2007) suggests 
that current EU ETS prices are 27% lower due to RES-E participation. In this case, using carbon 
prices to evaluate mitigation could underestimate the potential abatement savings of RES (see 
Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the policy framework in the EU, including the EU 
ETS and RES-E promotion instruments). 
On the other hand, the approaches to SCC-based carbon valuation compute the net present value 
of the incremental damage due to a small increase in CO2 emissions (i.e. the marginal damage 
cost of emissions). The SCC includes changes in agricultural productivity, human health, 
property damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services, among others 
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(Greenstone, Kopstis and Wolverton, 2013). From a policy perspective, the SCC would be 
equivalent to a Pigouvian tax levied on carbon (Tol, 2009). The aim of this approach is to 
express non-market impacts in monetary value for policy decision making; this translation is 
based on different assumptions: the rate at which the benefits (or costs) are discounted, the way 
in which uncertainty is treated, the selected projections of CO2 emissions and the chosen 
estimates for the rate of global warming, among others (Tol, 2009). Different assumptions would 
result in different monetary values of the SCC, which increases the uncertainties of this method.
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Tol (2005) evaluated 94 estimates from 28 published studies of marginal damage costs under 
different discount rates and showed that lower discount rates not only increase the SCC 
estimates, but also the uncertainty. According to this analysis, the combined mean estimate for 
marginal damage cost is $16/tCO2 for a 3% pure rate of time preference, not exceeding $62/tCO2 
with a probability of 95%, and $51/tCO2 for a 1% discount rate. Given these values Tol (2005) 
claims that the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions are unlikely to exceed 
$50/tCO2. In a later study, Tol (2012) analyzed 232 SCC estimates, with mean values of 
EUR49/tCO2, modal estimates of EUR14/tCO2 and median of EUR32/tCO2. 
In addition to the theoretical literature, the SCC approach has already been used as a policy tool 
by the US Environmental Protection Agency. The US government established an Interagency 
Working Group (IWG, 2010) for developing SCC estimates. The purpose was to provide US 
agencies with an estimate for assessing the costs and benefits of an intended regulation. The 
quantitative SCC estimates come from three Integrated Assessment Models (DICE, FUND and 
PAGE)
6
 and three discount rates were selected in order to capture the uncertainties involved in 
regulatory impact analysis (IWG, 2010). The 3% rate is used as the central estimate; it represents 
the after-tax risk-free rate of return and it is usually recommended for US government policy 
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analysis (Ackerman and Stanton, 2012). The 5% rate (low estimate) represents the possibility 
that climate damages are positively correlated with market returns; and the 2.5% rate (high 
estimate) represents the negative correlation between the returns to climate mitigation and the 
economy’s growth rate (Greenstone, Kopits and Wolverton, 2013). The SCC estimates also 
include a fourth scenario for the 95
th
 percentile at a 3% discount rate, which represents the 
higher-than-expected impacts from temperature change that would occur at a lower probability 
and would be particularly harmful for society (IWG, 2010).  
The first US estimates were presented in 2010, revised in 2013 and corrected in minor ways in 
2015 (IWG, 2016).
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 These SCC estimates were determined at a global level rather than from a 
domestic perspective (which allows their use outside the US). First, because climate change is a 
global externality and, consequently, estimates should incorporate the global damages; and 
second, because one country alone (the US in this case) cannot solve the climate change problem 
(Greenstone, Kopits and Wolverton, 2013). Finally, these estimates do not weight damages by 
the income level in the region where they occur, which is one of the main sources of criticism of 
this methodology (together with the uncertainty that the selection of the discount rate imposes). 
Since the majority of climate impacts are expected to occur in low-income countries (Johnson 
and Hope, 2012), including equity weights would increase the SCC values. 
In 2007, the UK likewise set an official shadow price (£25.5/tCO2 in 2007, rising at an annual 
rate of 2% in real terms) for government policies based on SCC estimates (DECC, 2009). 
However, they shifted in 2009 to a target-consistent approach based on the EU ETS prices (to be 
consistent with the EU), although they continue to monitor the SCC. In fact, the EU trend is 
towards the use of carbon prices (EU ETS) in policy appraisal.  
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Table 1 shows some SCC estimates (mean, maximum and minimum values) for 2020 for the EU, 
UK and US. Despite the differences in methodology
8
 (e.g. US estimates do not consider equity 
weighting, whereas UK estimates include it) and monetary units, all of them are of similar order 
of magnitude. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Barbose et al. (2016) applied the SCC values from IWG (2016) to assess the economic benefits 
of compliance with the Renewable Portfolio Standards in terms of reduced climate change 
damages in the US. The authors reported benefits from avoided future damages associated with 
new RES-E in 2013 of $2.2 billion for the central estimate, $0.7 billion for the low, $3.5 billion 
for the high and $6.3 billion for the higher-than-expected case. In the case of Spain, Ortega, del 
Río, and Montero (2013) used the SCC modal and median values determined by Tol (2012) for 
the monetary valuation of CO2 emissions avoided by RES-E in the period 2002-2011, which 
ranged between EUR 1,714.4 and 5,385.9 million, depending on the scenario; Sanz et al. (2014) 
used the average carbon market price to provide an economic assessment of GHG savings 
associated with the use of biofuels for the transportation sector in Spain in 2010.  
Finally, despite the fact that CO2 is the most significant pollutant in climate and energy policy, 
given its impact on global climate change, other air emissions produced by conventional 
electricity generation also affect air quality conditions and are thus addressed at the local policy 
level (a reduction of these gases would induce health co-benefits, including avoided premature 
deaths and reduced morbidity).
 
Similarly to the SCC approach for CO2, Shindell (2015) applied 
the Social Cost of Atmospheric Release (SCAR) methodology for assessing the marginal cost of 
other air pollutants.  
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3. Methods and Data 
This paper explores the net social cost of regulation and analyzes whether RES-E has been a 
cost-effective mitigation mechanism. To this end, we first use a market algorithm to quantify the 
MOE effect of RES-E (Section 3.1). Then, we add the regulatory costs (subsidies) and compute 
the net effect of RES-E on final prices for consumers, i.e. the net monetary cost (Section 3.2). 
Our algorithm also provides the amount of energy from conventional sources that is displaced by 
RES-E, which measures the mitigation potential of RES-E in energy terms. We evaluate the 
environmental benefits in monetary terms (to make them comparable to the economic costs) 
using two different approaches: emissions market prices (Section 3.3) and a social cost approach 
(Section 3.4). Finally, we compute the net social cost considering both the net monetary cost and 
the environmental benefits. Figure 1 presents the diagram that summarizes our numerical 
approach. Note that in our analysis we are not presenting the variation in total welfare, since we 
focus only on the consumer surplus (ignoring the producer surplus). 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
3.1. Actual and Counterfactual Scenarios 
We need to determine the effect of RES on the electricity market in order to assess the monetary 
costs. A three-equation algorithm allows us to compute the day-ahead market
9
 hourly outcomes 
(see Appendix A.3 for a description of how this market operates). Equation (1) represents the 
fact that for each price pi the quantity traded (qmin) coincides with the short side of the market, 
supply (qbid) or demand (qask). Equation (2) computes the quantity traded (q) in one hour using 






𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝𝑖) = min⁡{𝑞𝑎𝑠𝑘(𝑝𝑖), 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑑(𝑝𝑖)}   (1) 
𝑞 = ⁡𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝𝑖
{𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝𝑖)}          (2) 
𝑝 = ⁡{𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑑
−1 (𝑞)}      (3) 
We need to introduce a set of equations, (4), one for each technology, to obtain the hourly 
electricity production for each technology at the market clearing prices. Subindex k stands for 
nuclear, coal, combined cycle, Special Regime (which includes RES-E and cogeneration), 
hydropower, and fuel or fuel-gas; 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑑_𝑘(𝑞) denotes the aggregate volume of matched bids from 
technology k at 𝑝𝑖 or lower prices, so that 𝑞 = ∑𝑘𝑞𝑘.  
𝑞𝑘 =⁡𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑑_𝑘(𝑞)     (4) 
The algorithm returns hourly time series of market clearing prices and quantities traded by 
technology type. We compute market values under two scenarios: the actual and the 
counterfactual. The former represents actual equilibrium outcomes for each hour, while the latter 
is the counterfactual equilibrium resulting from the exclusion of RES-E. In the counterfactual 
scenario, the RES-E generation is removed from the supply curve, while leaving the remaining 
technologies and demand unchanged.  
 
3.2. The net monetary cost of RES-E 
The comparison between the actual and counterfactual scenarios allows us to quantify the net 
monetary cost of RES-E. The net monetary cost is computed as the difference between the costs 
and the savings entailed by RES-E. The costs in our analysis refer to the regulatory costs, RC, or 
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subsidies (see Appendix A.2 for a description of the Spanish policy concerning the promotion of 
renewable sources in electricity generation), whereas the savings are related to the MOE and 
computed as the market cost difference between the counterfactual (PC*QC) and the actual 
(PA*QA) scenarios (MOE= PC*QC - PA*QA). Therefore, the net monetary cost (NMC) for 
consumers is NMC= RC-MOE, which would be positive if regulatory costs for renewable 
sources were higher than their market savings due to the MOE, or negative if RES entailed more 
savings than costs. We then divide the net monetary cost NMC by the amount of RES-E (QRES) 
and obtain the unit net monetary cost (UNC): UNC=NMC/QRES. 
The data to calculate the net monetary cost of RES-E come, on the one hand, from the market 
prices and quantities derived by our algorithm, computed on information on the hourly price and 
quantity bids from the Spanish electricity market operator (OMIE)
11
 (see OMIE, 2016). On the 
other hand, the National Commission of Markets and Competition (CNMC),
12
 the Spanish 
electricity system regulator, provides data on public support of RES-E (see CNMC, 2015).  
Finally, since electricity demand is subject to high daily and seasonal variations, we also assess 
the effect by considering the demand daily patterns. We split the results for the peak hours (high 
demand) and the off-peak hours (low demand).
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3.3. Environmental Perspective 
In order to address the environmental effect, the net monetary cost is compared with the value of 
the avoided emissions resulted from renewable participation in the day-ahead market. The 
comparison between the net monetary cost and the benefit from avoided CO2, SO2, NOx and PM 
emissions represents the impact of RES-E as a mitigation resource (the net social cost).  
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 We first compute the amount of energy from conventional sources that is displaced by RES-E, 
where CCD stands for the quantity displaced for combined cycle plants, CTD for coal, FGD for 
fuel-gas, HYD for hydropower and NUD for nuclear to calculate avoided emissions. Each of these 
variables is computed as the difference between the energy traded for each technology in the 
actual and counterfactual scenarios. For instance, CCD=QCCA-QCCC, where QCCA is the amount of 
energy corresponding to combined cycle plants in the actual scenario and QCCC is the amount of 
combined cycle energy in the counterfactual scenario without RES-E.  
Once we obtain the annual mitigation in energy terms (GWh) for each technology, we translate it 
into emission terms (tons of pollutant) multiplying the energy savings in GWh by the emission 
potential of each technology in t/GWh (CNMC, 2014). We perform it for the three emitting 
technologies: combined cycle, coal and fuel-gas; and for four different pollutants: CO2, SO2, NOx 
and PM. CO2 is the most significant for global warming in the long term (a long-lived gas). 
However other air pollutants such as SO2, NOx and PM also deserve attention, since they impact 
air quality (leading to adverse health effects) and worsen the environment (e.g. the acid rain 
affecting forests and water reservoirs).
14
  
The CNMC (CNMC 2014) published yearly figures for CO2, SO2, NOx and PM emissions in 
grams per kWh for combined cycle, coal and fuel-gas between 2001 and 2012; we assume that 
the emission potential of 2012 holds also for 2013, 2014 and 2015. 
For the monetary valuation of the avoided emissions, we use two different approaches, i.e. the 
market approach (Section 3.3.1) and the social cost approach (Section 3.3.2), given that both of 
them may offer some advantages over the other. For instance, volatility in the emission 
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allowances prices is large, but uncertainty levels on social cost estimates are also high (see 
Section 2 above). 
3.3.1. Market Approach 
Under the assumption that the market for emission allowances is optimally designed, the market 
price would reflect the value of environmental damages of an additional unit of pollutant. For 
CO2 analysis we use the price of the EU ETS system for the period 2008-2015, which comprises 
Phases II and III (Sendeco2, 2016). However, for the remaining of pollutants, due to the lack of 
markets in Europe, we use 2008-2015 US Clean Air Market auction prices for SO2 (EIA, 2012 
and EPA, 2016) and during 2008-2011 for NOx (EIA, 2012).
15
 The RES-E mitigation potential is 
computed by multiplying the annual avoided emissions by the annual allowance price.  
3.3.2. Social Cost Approach 
Relaxing the assumption that the market price for emission allowances reflects the value of the 
environmental damages, another option is to estimate directly the social cost of the 
environmental damages using the SCC approach for CO2 and the SCAR approach for SO2 and 
NOx.  
We use US data (IWG, 2016) for the SCC approach, given that they contain SCC estimates for 
each year from 2010 until 2050 and are currently being used with policy purposes. Our analysis 
considers the period 2008-2015, so we compute the SCC estimates for 2008 and 2009 as a linear 
projection using the growth rate between the 2010 and 2015 estimates. Table 2 shows the SCC 
values in $/tCO2 (2007-constant US dollars). The use of different discount rates provides lower 
and upper limits for our calculations. In order to convert the values into current euros, the 
reported price in dollars for each discount rate is divided by the annual exchange rate reported by 
16 
 
the Spanish central bank (Banco de España, in short BDE) and multiplied by a GDP deflator 
retrieved from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The SCC estimates in current euros 
are then multiplied by the avoided emissions of CO2. The result is the total value of the SCC in 
current euros. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
For the SCAR approach we obtain the estimates using data from Shindell (2015), which are 
available only for the year 2010 and for the 5% and 3% discount rates, and IWG (2016). Shindell 
(2015) provides the valuation of a 1% reduction of 2010 anthropogenic emissions for CO2, SO2 
and NOx (among other pollutants). Observing the ratios CO2 - SO2 and CO2 - NOx, and using 
these ratios together with the SCC estimates from IWG (2016), we calculate SCAR estimates for 
SO2 and NOx (see Table 3). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4. Results and Discussion 
Applying the methodology described in Section 3, we compute the effect of regulation on RES-E 
development and its economic burden on consumer prices (Section 4.1). Additionally, we 
analyze some of the environmental implications of RES-E deployment and we quantify them in 
economic terms following different approaches (Section 4.2). Finally, we combine the net 
monetary cost and the environmental benefits to report the net social cost (Section 4.3). If the 
regulatory costs of RES-E turned out to be lower than the environmental benefits, RES-E could 
be considered a cost-effective mechanism against climate change. In any case, RES-E produces 
other socio-economic benefits (employment, local industry deployment, security of supply, 
savings in imported fossil fuels, etc.) that are not considered in our analysis. 
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4.1. The net monetary cost  
During the period 2002-2015, the market electricity prices dropped due to the MOE of RES-E. 
Figure 2 shows the annual average price difference (solid line) between the actual (PA) and 
counterfactual (PC) scenarios (PC-PA). Note that the price difference due to RES-E broadened 
after 2004, coinciding with the passing of the Spanish Renewable Energy Act. It increased by 
almost ten times in just two years (2004-2006), from 2.8 to 25 EUR/MWh, and this price gap 
peaked at almost 45 EUR/MWh in 2009. Despite the cuts to the FIT-FIP system since 2010, 
between 2006 and 2015 the price difference has never been below 24 EUR/MWh.  
Figure 2 also shows persistence across peak and off-peak periods in the price reduction, although 
gaps are larger for the high demand hours (dashed) than for the low demand ones (dotted line) 
and mean price reductions (solid line) lay between them. This is due to the fact that RES displace 
more fossil electricity in high demand hours and, therefore, the MOE is larger. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Although RES-E decreased electricity prices in the period 2002-2015, the growth of RES-E on 
the Spanish electricity market has been supported through an incentive system based on FIT and 
FIP, implying an increasing financial burden for the system. Figure 3 shows that the annual 
regulatory cost for RES-E (dashed line) rapidly increased as RES-E production (solid line) 
soared upward. In 2002, the regulatory cost represented EUR 13 million, and in just four years it 
exponentially rose to over EUR 1 billion in 2006. Between 2006 and 2008, the support scheme 
cost rose by almost EUR 1 billion per year. In addition, in just one year (2008-2009) the support 
cost shot up by almost EUR 3 billion. After 2009, the support cost continued to increase up until 
2013 when it reached EUR 9 billion, its maximum level. Finally, the burden for 2014 and 2015 
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decreased by over EUR 1 million due to a lower RES-E participation in the pool after the 
electricity reform that phased out the FIT-FIP system in Spain. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Figure 4 presents the unit net monetary cost of RES-E (solid line), computed as the difference 
between the market savings derived from RES-E participation (through the MOE) and the 
regulatory costs entailed by RES-E, divided by the amount of RES-E sold on the market. 
Positive values indicate that the costs incurred by RES-E exceed the savings, whereas negative 
values reflect the cost saving potential of RES-E. We also present the net effect for high (dashed 
line) and low (dotted line) demand periods in order to highlight the relevance of the demand in 
the accounting of RES-E costs. 
After showing some fluctuations between 2003 and 2007, we observe that the mean unit net 
monetary cost started to grow steadily in 2007, but the market savings due to RES-E were still 
able to compensate for the regulatory costs until 2010. Afterwards, the unit net cost was always 
positive (between 27 and 38 EUR/MWh from 2011 to 2015). Figure 4 also shows that the last 
regulatory reform in 2014 did not reduce the unit net cost, although the phasing out of the FIT-
FIP incentive scheme had the immediate effect of reducing the regulatory burden. The reduction 
of the MOE due to a lower renewable participation is behind the higher final unit net cost of 
RES-E.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
Concerning the effect of the demand patterns, Figure 4 shows that the unit net cost is higher 
when demand is low (dotted line) and lower when demand is high (dashed line). The discrepancy 
is due to the different technologies that RES replaces: more thermal production in high demand, 
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with a higher cost. However, differences by demand diminish after 2013. This is partly due to the 
combination of lower electricity demand in the period with reduced hydropower participation 
and the last regulatory reform, which has also affected renewable participation in the pool.  
4.2. Environmental Impact of RES-E 
The deployment of RES-E displaces conventional sources of electricity generation that depend 
on combustion to generate electricity and emit GHG to the atmosphere as a by-product of the 
process. The most significant GHG of electricity generation is CO2, but other gases that are 
potentially harmful for climate, such as SO2 and NOx, should also be taken into account. The 
purpose of this section is to assess the environmental impact of RES-E on the Spanish electricity 
market, by translating emission reductions into monetary values. Results are highly dependent on 
the methodology employed to monetize the emission savings, which highlights the role of 
uncertainty in the environmental benefits assessment.  
Figure 5 shows the amount of energy by conventional sources that was displaced each year due 
to RES-E participation during the period 2002-2015. Note that when renewable participation 
peaks, the displaced share of the other technologies also increases. These figures are computed as 
the difference between the annual energy traded in equilibrium in the actual (with RES-E) and 
counterfactual (without RES-E) scenarios.  
Combined cycle and hydropower are the most affected (since they usually are the marginal 
technologies setting the market price), followed by coal. The participation of fuel-gas in the 
Spanish pool is residual (in fact, it is zero after 2011) and is therefore barely affected by RES-E. 
Finally, nuclear power is also unaffected by RES-E given that it is a baseload technology. 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
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The replacement of conventional sources of energy has decreased the emissions of some 
pollutants. The avoided emissions are obtained by multiplying the emission potential for each 
pollutant (t/GWh) by the displaced amount (GWh) of each fossil technology: combined cycle, 
coal and fuel/fuel-gas. Table 4 shows the avoided emissions from 2002 to 2015 for CO2, SO2, 
NOx and PM. Results are presented by energy source.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
We observe that the largest avoided emissions are derived from the displacement of coal sources. 
Although the number of GWh displaced is higher for other technologies (e.g. combined cycle, 
see Figure 5), the environmental effect of RES-E on coal is the most relevant, given its high 
emission potential. Note also that the effect on avoided CO2 emissions (measured in Mt) 
outweighs the other air pollutants (measured in kt).  
Once we have computed the emission savings, we translate them into economic benefits. In order 
to do this, we need to price the emissions, for which we consider two different methodologies. 
Table 5 shows the savings in millions of euros of the avoided emissions using market prices. We 
use the EU ETS market price for CO2 emissions and the US air market prices for SO2 and NOx 
(converting the prices in dollars to euros). Similarly, Table 6 shows the savings using the social 
cost methodology. We apply the SCC estimates used in US policy evaluation for CO2 and derive 
the values for SO2 and NOx from the SCAR methodology by Shindell (2015). Given the data 
availability on emission prices, we present the results for the period 2008-2015 for CO2 and only 
for the year 2010 for SO2 and NOx. Further research would be needed to compute social costs 
estimates for longer timeframes, but this is out of the scope of this paper. 
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As Table 5 illustrates, the volatility of the EU ETS price affects the emission savings accounting. 
This is particularly evident between 2011 and 2015, when the allowance price was around EUR 
5-7, diminishing the economic effect of the greatest emission reduction due to RES-E. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Taking a look at the social cost approach in Table 6, we observe the variability of the results 
according to the selected discount rate (5%, 3% or 2.5%). High discount rates lead to lower 
savings than low discount rates, since the valuation today of environmental damages in the future 
is lower. The highest savings are obtained for the 95th percentile of the 3% scenario, which 
represents the low probability of very harmful climatic consequences. If we compare the 
economic quantification of the emission savings under the market and the social cost approach, 
we conclude that the environmental savings considering market prices after 2012 are lower than 
those with the highest rate considered in the SCC approach. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Comparing our results with Ortega, del Río and Montero (2013), which also monetize CO2 
emissions reductions in Spain from 2002 to 2011, but using a different methodology, we observe 
that our market approach values for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are in their ranges when they use a 
CO2 price of 14 EUR/tCO2 (their values range from 322.2 to 239.5 million euros in 2009, from 
376.5 to 259.3 in 2010 and from 269.0 to 390.1 in 2011). 
4.3. The net social cost  
Assuming that Spain is a price taker and would not be able to change emission allowance prices, 
we consider that emission prices would not vary in our counterfactual situation without RES-E 
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and, therefore, this would not interact with the price reductions derived from the MOE. In this 
case, the environmental savings of RES-E computed in Section 4.2 could be added to the net 
monetary cost computed in Section 4.1 to determine the net social cost of RES-E.  
Table 7 reports the unit net cost of RES considering the environmental benefits derived from the 
reduction of CO2, as well as the net monetary cost. We observe that the valuation of the 
environmental benefits of CO2 reduction is small compared to the net monetary cost. The results 
indicate that the promotion policy to RES implemented in Spain was justified in economic terms 
only until 2011. After that year, despite the environmental benefits, RES-E was not able to cover 
the huge regulatory costs. In fact, regulatory costs in Spain were over EUR 6 billion per year 
from 2009 onwards, and over EUR 9 billion euros in 2013, (see Figure 3), amounts impossible to 
compensate even with large environmental benefits.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
A caveat is in order. Given that we were able to compute the savings due to SO2 and NOx only 
for one year (2010), these gases were not taken into account in the calculation of the unit net 
social cost. In any case, their contribution to the social cost in 2010 (the single year with 
available data) does not change the sign of the net social cost.  
Finally, given that the net social cost is positive from 2011 onwards, we compute in Table 8 the 
CO2 price that would have led to zero social cost, that is, the CO2 valuation that would 
compensate the actual promotion costs of RES-E. We observe that carbon prices should have 
been around 100 EUR/tCO2 from 2011 to 2014 and close to 200 EUR/t CO2 in 2015, values that 
are much higher than the highest estimates for the social cost of carbon.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
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Compared with the literature, Marcantonini and Ellerman (2015) found an average implicit 
carbon price (i.e. net cost without carbon cost saving divided by CO2 emission reduction) of 57 
EUR/tCO2 for wind power and 552EUR/tCO2 for solar energy in Germany (the huge difference 
between these two prices is attributed to the fact that the remuneration per MWh in Germany is 
much higher for solar than for wind, as it happens in Spain). Using the same methodology, 
Marcantonini and Valero (2017) found that average costs in Italy were around 165 EUR/tCO2 
for wind power and around 1000 EUR/tCO2 for solar, higher than in Germany (again, due to the 
differences of the support levels). Our averages are in this range, taking into account that we 
consider all technologies as a whole, and that wind participation in Spain is much higher than 
solar.  
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The promotion of RES-E implementation by the Spanish government reflects its commitment to 
signed international agreements in the fight against climate change. Initially this effort produced 
important savings in the system by reducing the electricity market price. However, the evolution 
of the regulatory costs of the RES-E has turned into a heavy burden for the Spanish electricity 
system. In fact, the savings due to RES-E could no longer compensate for the rapidly growing 
regulatory costs after 2010 (Ciarreta, Espinosa and Pizarro-Irizar, 2014).  
In this paper, we computed the net effect of RES-E on the Spanish day-ahead market for the 
period 2002-2015 by comparing the net monetary cost (savings due to the merit order effect and 
the costs of the regulatory system) to the social environmental benefits of avoided emissions. 
Our conclusion is that, although important, the valuation of environmental benefits after 2011 
did not justify the huge regulatory costs of RES-E promotion and as a consequence the 
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promotion of RES-E had a positive net unit social cost (around 20 EUR/MWh) imposed on 
consumers. 
The net unit social cost has been decreasing from 2011 to 2014, due to a regulatory reform (see 
Appendix A.2). The reform has brought about lower incentive levels and lower renewable 
participation. However, the overall effect of the new incentive scheme still remains unclear. On 
the one hand, subsidies have decreased with respect to the previous system based on tariffs and 
premiums, which had led to an increasing deficit in the Spanish electricity system until 2013 (in 
2014 and 2015 there has been a surplus for the first time since 2000). Yet on the other hand, the 
lower incentives have reduced renewable participation and the merit order effect, increasing 
consumer prices. In any case, it is still soon to confirm if this fall in the RES-E share is due to the 
regulatory reform or is a consequence of other market conditions (market structure, demand, 
weather conditions…). This phenomenon would need further analysis in the coming years. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that in the last few years after the reform, the reduction in the MOE 
dominated over the regulatory cost reduction so that electricity reform may have backfired and 
increased the costs for consumers (the regulatory cost has decreased but prices at the pool are 
higher due to the MOE, so that the final price paid by consumers has increased).  
These results raise important concerns about the economic implications of RES as a cost-
effective mitigation resource. RES have displaced electricity generated by conventional sources, 
leading to a reduction of GHG emissions into the atmosphere. This phenomenon is remarkable 
when considering CO2, the most significant and long-lasting GHG. To address this issue, we use 
two different methods to assess the economic value of RES-E environmental impact. First, we 
used the market price of the EU ETS system based on the “cap-and-trade” principle; and second, 
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we took the social cost approach based on the SCC estimates for CO2 and SCAR estimates for 
SO2 and NOx.  
The assessment of the avoided emissions showed that even including the environmental benefits 
of RES-E, these sources are not able to cover for the regulatory costs after 2011. The reduced 
prices in the EU ETS system during the last years have led to very small emission savings 
valuation for RES-E. Finally, we also observed that the choice of the approach for evaluating the 
emissions is extremely important for policy analysis, since the unit net social cost was reduced 
with lower discount rates. However, what should be the optimal discount rate is still under 
debate.  
This last evidence opens the door to other questions for future research. First, the low prices of 
the EU ETS system may encourage thermal electricity production, so it would be interesting to 
analyze to what extent these low prices could impact the RES-E deployment process and CO2 
emission reduction. Second, the savings due to avoided fuel imports would also add to the 
economic benefits of RES-E and, thus, should be considered. Finally, other non-environmental 
positive externalities should also be included in policy decision making, such as employment 
creation, health benefits or industrial development; as well as other costs entailed by the 
intermittency of some RES, such as back-up capacity cost, distribution and transmission costs, 
that could not be captured with the merit order effect.  
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 Total primary energy supply considers: production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers - 
international aviation bunkers +/- stock changes. 
2
 Annual average prices in the European Emission Trading system in 2013 were 4.45 EUR/tCO2 (Sendeco2, 2016) 
and the mean SCC estimate in the studies analyzed by Tol (2012) is 49 EUR/tCO2. The lowest mean SCC estimate 
(considering a 3% rate of time preference) is 5 EUR/tCO2. 
3
 Environmental externalities of renewable energy production can be divided into two categories that distinguish 
emissions of pollutants with global impacts (i.e. GHG) from those with local and/or regional impacts (i.e. pollutants 
other than GHG) (Owen, 2004). 
4
 More precisely, they included 12 EU Member States plus Switzerland. 
5
 For instance, Nordhaus (2007) calculated an optimal price of carbon for 2015 of $35/tCO2, rising over time to $85 
in 2050 and to $206 in 2100. Wahba and Hope (2006) estimated a SCC mean value between $14/tCO2 and 
$19/tCO2, depending on the selected scenario. 
6
 See Johnston (2016) for a detailed description of SCC estimates. 
7
 Howard and Sterner (2017) propose a new damage function based on different high-temperature damage estimates 
and conclude that this change would increase the resulting SCC of the Interagency Working Group by between one-
and-a-half to twofold. 
8 Differences in methodology may include different assumptions about emission scenario, climate sensitivity, impact 
estimates, adaptation, valuation, vulnerability, equity weighting, and risk aversion (Tol, 2012). 
9
 We do not consider intra-day markets and technical restrictions in our analysis and we work with day-ahead 
market prices rather than with final prices. Ciarreta, Espinosa and Pizarro-Irizar (2014) use a similar approach, since 
the day-ahead market stands for more than 80% of the final price. 
10
 For a detailed explanation of this algorithm see Ciarreta, Espinosa and Pizarro-Irizar (2014). 
11
 Operador del Mercado Ibérico de Electricidad. 
12
 Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia. 
13
 We use the classification of the Spanish Ministry of Economy: 8 high-demand-hours and 5 low-demand-hours in 






 CO2 policies are usually directed at a global level, whereas air pollutants are generally targeted at a local scale 
(city, country level). However, there is some support for policies designed to address them jointly (Bollen et al., 
2009 and Xu and Masui, 2009). 
15
 The Clean Air Act directs the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to identify and set air quality standards for 
the following air pollutants: Ozone (O3), Carbon monoxide (CO), Nitrogen oxides (NOx), Sulfur dioxide (SO2), 
Particulate matter with aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 10 micrometers (PM10), Particulate matter with 
aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 2.5 micrometers (PM2.5), and Lead (Pb). Given the public data 
availability we focus on SO2 and NOx.  
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Appendix: Renewable energy promotion on the Spanish electricity market 
Spain is committed to the EU’s climate policy (Section A.1), but it also has strong national policies (Section A.2). 
The analysis of these policies is important to understand the development of RES-E in the past. Additionally, the 
Spanish electricity market rules are another key factor to assess the economic implications of RES-E (Section A.3).  
A.1. Policy Framework in the European Union 
The EU has been implementing a common policy framework for facing the climate change challenge for several 
years. Specifically, the Energy and Climate Change Package 2013–2020 contains four directives for common EU 
legislation: on the amendment to the EU ETS, on the promotion of RES, on effort sharing, and on carbon capture 
and storage (Jäger-Waldau et al., 2011). 
The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade emission scheme for CO2. The system imposes an aggregated emission cap for all 
the CO2 emitters and a trading system is implemented among them, thus resulting in a CO2 price (Delarue and van 
den Bergh, 2016). The EU ETS is the largest international system for trading GHG emission allowances, operating 
in 31 countries and covering different sectors, such as the electricity power sector, other heavy industries (cement, 
steel, aluminum, pulp and paper) and aviation (flights within Europe), and almost half of the EU's greenhouse 
emissions (EU, 2013).  
The EU ETS was implemented in 2005 and has been deployed in three different phases (EU, 2016). Phase I was 
implemented from 2005 to 2007, only CO2 emissions from power plants and energy-intensive industries were 
considered and almost all the allowances were given for free through the National Allocation plan. Phase II, between 
2008 and 2012, implied a slight reduction of the cap and auction were carried out in several countries. Finally, Phase 
III comprises from 2013 to 2020 and implies the implementation of a single EU cap, auction is recognized as the 
method for allocating allowances and its rules have been harmonized.  
Concerning the promotion of RE, Directive 2009/28/EC set a common framework for the EU in 2009. The Directive 
established mandatory national targets for the overall share of energy from renewable sources in gross final 
consumption. In detail, such mandatory national overall targets were consistent with a binding target of at least a 20 
% share of energy from renewable sources in the gross final energy consumption in 2020, including individual 
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targets by country. For achieving this goal, each Member State designed and implemented support schemes at a 
national level.  
From a national perspective, a broad range of support schemes has been deployed in the promotion of RES-E. There 
are two broad categories of market based instruments (IEA 2008): investment support (capital grants, tax 
exemptions or reductions on the purchase of goods) and operating support (price subsidies, green certificates, tender 
schemes and tax exemptions or reductions on the production of electricity). Among them, FIT has been considered 
the most effective scheme for encouraging the exponential growth of RES-E in the EU (Couture and Gagnon, 2010 
and Jenner, Groba, and Indvik, 2013).  
The central principle of the FIT is the establishment of granted prices for RES-E producers during fixed periods of 
time (Couture and Gagnon, 2010). This policy design is divided into market-independent and market-dependent FIT 
policies regarding the remuneration model. The former is known as fixed-price policy and sets a fixed or minimum 
price for RES electricity delivered to the grid. The latter, named premium-price policy or FIP, adds a premium to the 
market price. In summary, fixed-price policy implies the total price per unit of electricity paid while premiums are 
supplementary to the market price. The special feature of the FIT guarantees in advanced the payment level, thus 
offering security for the investments in RES-E by granting reliable revenue streams. On the other hand, FIP creates 
more efficient markets by allowing the remuneration adjust to the market demand, creating an incentive to supply 
electricity when demand increase.  
A.2. RES-E Generation and Policy Evolution in Spain  
Since the 1980s, the Spanish electricity legislative framework has been modified and adapted to promote RES-E 
implementation. In 1997, the Electricity Sector Act (Act 54/97) (BOE, 1997) established the Special Regime (SR) to 
distinguish renewable from conventional (Ordinary Regime, OR) fuel sources of electricity. The SR included 
renewable technologies (onshore wind, solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, small-scale hydropower, biomass, wastes 
and waste treatment) and cogeneration with capacity below 50 MW.  
In 2004, the Spanish Renewable Energy Act (RD 436/2004) (BOE, 2004) was set up to fit into the existing general 
framework supporting RES-E. Generators could decide to sell their electricity to a distributor and receive a fix tariff 
(FIT) or sell it on the free market and receive a premium on top of the market price (FIP), what we call the FIT-FIP 
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system. This decree provided incentives for new RES installed capacity and led to the actual took off of RE in 
Spain.  
The steeped growing trend of the RES-E generation continued for almost a decade, nevertheless accompanied by 
continuous adjustments of the support schemes, in an attempt to reduce the costs of the incentive system. In 2007, 
new tariffs and premiums for RES-E generators were established in the New Spanish Renewable Energy Act, as 
well as a cap and a floor for renewable remuneration (RD 661/2007) (BOE, 2007) and this led to the greatest 
renewable energy expansion in Spain.  
Between 2010 and 2014 a series of legal actions were issued regarding financial adjustments, in an attempt to reduce 
the tariff deficit that arose due to the imbalance between the revenues and the costs of the Spanish electricity system. 
In 2010, the RES-E production level reached 94,101 GWh in 2010, nearly 50% of the Spanish electricity market. 
That same year the government enacted RD 1614/2010 (BOE, 2010) for adjusting downward the FIT of the wind 
generation technology. In 2012, the financial support for RES-E facilities (RD-L1/2012) (BOE, 2012) was 
abolished. One year later, the premiums for RES power generation were suppressed (RD-L2/2013) (BOE, 2013a) 
and the FIT were revoked and replaced by a flat fee investment incentive (RD-L9/2013) (BOE, 2013b). As a result 
of the measures, the year 2013 represented a turning point of the RES power generation after its production peaked 
at 110,455 GWh.  
Finally, the RD 413/2014 (BOE, 2014) published in mid-2014 established a new remuneration scheme in order to 
provide a rate of return in addition to the electricity market price. This measure was followed by a smooth decline of 
RES-E between 2014 and 2015. However, in spite of the downturn during the last two years of the period, the RES-
E production share on the Spanish electricity market in 2015 was still above 50%.  
[Insert Figure A.1 here] 
Figure A.1 shows the relationship between RES-E evolution and the policies deployed along the period. In that 
sense, the highest RES-E growth came after the Renewable Energy Act and the New Renewable Energy Act in 2004 
and 2007, respectively. However, the more restrictive policies implemented after 2010 led to smaller RES-E growth 
rates and even a reduction of the RES-E share after the phasing out of the FIT-FIP system in 2013.  
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Concerning the financial burden of the Spanish electricity system shown in Figure A.2, we observe that the trend of 
previous annual deficits ended in 2014, where there was a surplus for the first time since 2000. This surplus is the 
result of the regulatory reform of the electricity sector, which stated a new incentive scheme for RES-E in 2014, but 
with retroactive effects since 2013. That is, SR generators continued receiving the corresponding FIT during the 
period between the phasing out of the tariffs and the establishment of the new procedure to set the incentives. This 
forced some RES-E generators (mainly wind and cogeneration) to return the received incentives during 2013 and 
2014 if their value under the former scheme was higher than the support they should get under the new system. The 
evolution of the deficit in the next years will tell whether this surplus persists over time or it is just a temporary 
effect derived from the adjustment in the liquidations. In any case, despite the positive results in 2014 and 2015, the 
electricity system's accumulated debt still amounted to EUR 25 billion at the end of 2015 (Ciarreta, Espinosa and 
Zurimendi, 2016).  
[Insert Figure A.2 here] 
A.3. The Spanish Day-ahead Market  
The wholesale electricity price in the Iberian Peninsula is determined by a set of markets. The electricity system 
comprises the day-ahead (or daily market), intra-day markets and the ancillary services market. According to the 
Electricity Market Operator (in short OMIE), the daily market accounts for more than 80% of the final day-ahead 
market price, while the intraday market, technical restrictions, capacity payments and other processes of the system 
operator explains the other 20% (OMIE, 2016). For that reason we will focus on the day-ahead market. 
The day-ahead market is the mechanism for handling bids on a daily basis (OMIE, 2016). It is performed once a day 
at noon to set the amount and price of the electricity exchanged for each of the twenty-four hours of the following 
day. The day-ahead market manages the sale and purchase bids that are presented by market participants. The bids 
can be presented in two ways: simple and complex. The simple ones only include price and amount of energy; the 
complex ones incorporate other technical or economic features. The market participants are the sellers represented 
by electricity generation companies and the buyers include consumers and retailers.  
The day-ahead market works as a uniform price double auction which determines the market clearing price and 
energy traded by the intersection point between the supply and demand curves. The curves are constituted by sorting 
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the bids by its price: the supply curve is built in an ascending order, while the demand curve is built in a descending 
order. The framework implies that electricity generators maximize their benefits by bidding their opportunity cost, 
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Figure 1. The net social cost of RES-E promotion 
 
Note: The negative sign (-) stands for benefits and the positive sign (+) stands for costs. 
Figure 2. Price reduction due to RES-E by demand (EUR/MWh) 
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Figure 3. Annual RES-E participation in the day-ahead market (GWh) and annual 
regulatory cost (million euros) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OMIE (2016) (RES-E participation) and CNMC 

































































































Figure 4. Unit net monetary cost of RES-E promotion by demand (EUR/MWh) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OMIE (2016) and CNMC (2015).  
Figure 5. Energy displaced due to RES-E by technology (GWh) 
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Figure A.1 RES-E generation evolution and policy milestones, 2002-2015 (GWh) 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on OMIE (2016) and IEA (2015). 
Figure A.2 Tariff deficit evolution and policy milestones, 2000-2015 (million euros) 
  




Table 1. Social Cost of Carbon. Estimates for 2020 
Country Mean  Range  Reference 
EU  49 EUR/tCO2 10-439 EUR/tCO2 Tol, 2012 
UK 90 £/tCO2 55-160 £/tCO2 Watkiss and Downing, 2008 
US 42 $/tCO2 12-123 $/tCO2 IWG, 2016 
Note about mean values: Tol (2012) aggregates all available estimates into a single distribution (including different 
discount rates), Watkiss and Downing (2008) consider a 3.5% discount rate and IWG (2016) a 3% discount rate. 
Source: Own elaboration based on Watkiss and Downing, (2008), Tol (2012) and IWG (2016).  
Table 2. Annual SCC estimates (2007-constant $/tCO2) 
 Discount Rate  
 
5% 3% 2.5% 3% 
 
Average Average Average 
95th 
percentile 
2008 10 29 48 79 
2009 10 30 49 82 
2010 10 31 50 86 
2011 11 32 51 90 
2012 11 33 53 93 
2013 11 34 54 97 
2014 11 35 55 101 
2015 11 36 56 105 
 
Source: IWG (2016) and own elaboration for 2008 and 2009 (based on the growth rate from 





Table 3. Annual SCAR estimates in $/tSO2 and $/tNOx (2007-constant dollars) 
 Discount Rate 
 SO2 NOx 
 
5% 3% 5% 3% 
 
Average Average Average Average 
2010 45 47 26 26 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Shindell (2015) and IWG (2016). 
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Table 4. Avoided emissions by pollutant and technology: CO2 (Mt), SO2 (kt), NOx (kt) and PM (kt) 
year 

































2002 0.01 0 0 0 0.098 1.70 0.30 0.04 ~0 ~0 ~0 0 0.11 1.71 305 0.04 
2003 0.07 0 0 0 0.96 14.18 3.10 0.36 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.01 1.11 14.45 3.22 0.37 
2004 0.18 0 0 0 0.85 13.28 2.88 0.32 0.12 0.36 0.18 0.02 1.15 13.64 3.06 0.34 
2005 1.20 0 0 0 3.36 52.42 11.08 1.26 1.37 4.13 2.16 0.18 5.93 56.55 13.23 1.44 
2006 3.88 0 0 0 7.13 111.78 23.80 2.48 1.38 3.93 2.14 0.18 12.39 115.71 25.95 2.65 
2007 7.55 0 0 0 5.12 76.63 16.58 1.63 1.31 3.21 1.86 0.17 13.99 79.84 18.43 1.80 
2008 6.60 0 0 0 8.75 33.23 21.46 2.31 0.29 1.87 1.10 0.11 15.64 35.10 22.56 2.42 
2009 7.93 0 0 0 10.96 38.48 24.59 2.60 0.23 0.47 0.30 0 19.12 38.95 24.90 2.60 
2010 8.76 0 0 0 14.44 47.04 28.79 3.41 1.53 2.57 1.84 0 24.74 49.61 30.62 3.41 
2011 9.69 0 0 0 20.01 60.59 44.59 4.78 0 1.03 0.96 0 29.70 61.62 45.54 4.78 
2012 12.67 0 0 0 17.39 57.08 40.79 4.18 0 0.59 0.47 0 30.06 57.67 41.26 4.18 
2013 11.92 0 0 0 18.78 61.63 44.04 4.51 0 0.61 0.49 0 30.70 62.24 44.53 4.51 
2014 10.65 0 0 0 18.26 59.91 42.81 4.38 0 0.13 0.10 0 28.91 60.04 42.91 4.38 
2015 8.91 0 0 0 9.88 32.42 23.16 2.37 0 0 0 0 18.79 32.42 23.16 2.37 
TOTAL 90.01 0 0 0 136.00 660.38 327.97 34.63 6.31 19.17 11.71 0.66 232.33 679.55 339.68 35.30 
 Source: Own calculations based on data from OMIE (2016) and CNMC (2015). 
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Combined Cycle Coal Fuel/Fuel-Gas 
CO2 SO2 NOx CO2 SO2 NOx CO2 SO2 NOx 
2008 145 0 0 193 6 12 6 0.4 0.6 
2009 104 0 0 143 2 5 3 0.0 0.1 
2010 125 0 0 207 1 1 22 0.0 0.1 
2011 125 0 0 258 0 1 0 0.0 0.0 















 2015 68 0   76 0   0 0.0   
TOTAL 777 0 0 1,196 9 18.6 31 0 0.7 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OMIE (2016) and Sendeco2 (2016). 











































2010 354 194 602 970 1,669 
 
0.6 1.75 1.83 
 
1.03 0.62 0.62 







2012 220 278 835 1,340 2,352 
 
   
 
   
2013 137 279 863 1,371 2,463 
 
   
 
   
2014 172 267 850 1,336 2,454 
 
   
 
   
2015 144 210 687 1,069 2,005 
 
   
 
   
TOTAL 2,005 1,720 5,302 8,448 15,001 
 
   
 

















Social Cost Approach to environmental damage 
5% 3% 2.5% 
3 % 95th 
percentile 
2008 -64.1 -69.4 -65.7 -69.0 -72.1 -77.3 
2009 -27.6 -30.7 -29.3 -32.8 -36.1 -41.9 
2010 4.1 0.4 2.1 -2.2 -6.2 -13.6 
2011 33.6 29.7 31.0 26.1 21.6 12.4 
2012 32.1 30.0 29.4 24.0 19.1 9.2 
2013 26.9 25.6 24.3 19.0 14.4 4.6 
2014 27.8 26.0 25.1 19.1 14.2 2.8 
2015 38.5 36.9 36.2 31.1 27.0 17.0 
Note: Negative values indicate that RES promotion involves a net social benefit. Net Unit Social 
Cost of RES includes the Net Monetary Cost and the environmental benefits. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OMIE (2016), CNMC (2015) and Sendeco2 
(2016).  
 
Table 8. CO2 price for a zero net social cost (EUR/tCO2) 
  
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
CO2 price  108.7 109.8 96.6 94.5 191.3 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
